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9-Misc: Science journals agree not to publish results that couldhelp terrorists



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TITLE:  Science Journals to Join Fight Against Terrorists
        Editors to Excise Material That Could Be Used by Militants to Help
        Make Biological Weapons
SOURCE: Associated Press/The Washington Post, USA, by Joseph B. Verrengia
        http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14222-2003Feb15.html
DATE:   Feb 16, 2003

------------------ archive: http://www.gene.ch/genet.html ------------------


Science Journals to Join Fight Against Terrorists
Editors to Excise Material That Could Be Used by Militants to Help Make
Biological Weapons

DENVER, Feb. 15 -- Editors of the world's leading scientific journals
announced today that they would delete details from published studies
that might help terrorists make biological weapons.

The editors, joined by several prominent scientists, said they would not
censor scientific data or adopt a top-secret classification system
similar to that used by the military and government intelligence agencies.

But they said scientists working in the post-Sept. 11 world must face the
dismaying paradox that many of their impressive breakthroughs can be used
for sinister purposes.

The new editing methods will be voluntary and will differ among the 32
publications and scientific associations that agreed to the effort. Those
include the journals Science, Nature, Proceedings of the National
Academies of Science, the New England Journal of Medicine and The Lancet.

Most major advancements -- from decoding the human genome to the cloning
of Dolly the sheep -- are revealed to the world through those journals.

The new policy emerged from a Jan. 9 meeting at the National Academy of
Sciences, where researchers and journal editors reviewed potentially
sensitive studies. They unveiled their agreement at the national meeting
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Proponents acknowledged they are walking a "very fine line" in trying to
protect the public without chilling research. Few, if any, of the
thousands of research papers reviewed annually for publication would be
rejected outright, they said. Papers would still contain sufficient
details to allow other scientists to independently duplicate experiments
-- a vital step in validating discoveries.

"We do live in different times now," said Ronald Atlas, president of the
American Society of Microbiology and a leader of the biosecurity review
movement. "The information we possess has the potential for misuse. We
will take the appropriate steps to protect the public."

Indeed, it has never been easier to tweak a microbe's genes to create a
deadlier, drug-resistant superbug for a germ bomb or hijack aerosol
technology meant for convenient spray vaccines to make anthrax spores
float through the air.

Journal editors said they were establishing their own expert panels to
review papers that contain alarming information, and would work with the
authors to make specific changes and "tone them down."

Most journals rarely face such questions. Atlas said journals published
by the microbiololgy association found two research papers in that past
year that raised eyebrows, and both were published after the authors
agreed to changes.

One of the excised details demonstrated how a microbe could be modified
so it could kill 1 million people instead of 10,000. "It was something
that was best not told," Atlas said. He declined to identify the microbe.

Atlas said spotting risky research is not black and white. "You know it
when you see it," he said.

It is a daunting task. Not only does the review cover obvious subjects
such as smallpox and toxic chemicals, but it also includes a wide array
of related scientific disciplines that could affect their diagnosis and
containment.

"There could be a paper on the rate of speed of a particular infection,"
said Science editor Donald Kennedy, formerly president of Stanford
University. "It could be of tremendous value in immunization and
quarantine strategies. But it could also be of tremendous value to
someone trying to evade those strategies."

Others worry that security measures could hamper breakthroughs in basic
science and engineering.